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Will Travel for Food:
Spatial Discounting in Two New World Monkeys
Jeffrey R. Stevens,1 Alexandra G. Rosati,1
Kathryn R. Ross,1 and Marc D. Hauser 1, 2, 3

Few studies have examined the effect of context on discounting behavior in animals (but see [4, 16–19]). Here, we
examine the role of context by comparing choice preferences
in different types of discounting tasks: temporal and spatial.
In previous research on temporal discounting, we offered
cotton-top tamarins and common marmosets choices between
a small food reward available immediately and a larger reward available after a time delay [5]. Results showed that marmosets waited significantly longer for the larger reward, suggesting that they discounted the temporal delay less steeply
than tamarins. In the current task, we assessed these species’ spatial discounting levels by presenting subjects with a
choice between a smaller, closer reward and a larger, more
distant reward. This choice maps onto natural foraging decisions frequently faced by animals: consume the few remaining food items nearby or travel to locate an untapped patch replete with food [20, 21]. We placed the close reward 35 cm
from the starting position and placed the distant reward at one
of seven distances, ranging from 35 to 245 cm away (Figure
1). With this design, we characterized how both species devalue food rewards as a function of travel distance. If context
does not affect discounting, then we should find the same pattern observed in the temporal discounting experiment. Because the time to receiving the reward is proportional to the
distance traveled, the more patient marmosets should also
prefer to travel farther. If, however, context does influence discounting in these primates (as it can in humans [15, 22–24]),
spatial discounting preferences may differ from temporal discounting preferences.
The magnitude of the reward also influences discounting
decisions. Models predict that the ratio between reward values, and not the absolute magnitude of those rewards, should
determine discounting patterns [1, 25, 26]. Discounting studies in pigeons and rats support these predictions: varying the
magnitude of rewards does not influence discounting levels
[3, 27, 28] (but see [29, 30] for possible exceptions). In contrast, humans seem to discount small rewards more highly
than large rewards [14, 31, 32]. We tested for magnitude effects by offering our subjects two sets of numerical contrasts.
Subjects chose between either one close and three far food
pellets in one condition or two close and six far pellets in another condition. Therefore, we maintained the 1:3 ratio of the
reward amounts but varied their absolute magnitudes, allowing us to assess whether these monkeys ignore magnitude, as
demonstrated by other animals, or discount differently over different magnitudes like humans.
When we presented both rewards at the shortest distance
(increment one), subjects (pooled over species) chose the
large reward in 96.1% ± 1.5% (mean ± SEM) of the trials but
only chose it in 68.8% ± 8.0% of the trials when we placed the
large reward at the farthest distance (increment seven). The
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Abstract
Nonhuman animals steeply discount the future, showing a preference
for small, immediate over large, delayed rewards [1–5]. Currently unclear is whether discounting functions depend on context. Here, we
examine the effects of spatial context on discounting in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus),
species known to differ in temporal discounting [5]. We presented subjects with a choice between small, nearby rewards and large, distant
rewards. Tamarins traveled farther for the large reward than marmosets, attending to the ratio of reward differences rather than their absolute values. This species difference contrasts with performance on a
temporal task in which marmosets waited longer than tamarins for the
large reward. These comparative data indicate that context influences
choice behavior, with the strongest effect seen in marmosets who discounted more steeply over space than over time. These findings parallel details of each species’ feeding ecology. Tamarins range over large
distances and feed primarily on insects, which requires using quick,
impulsive action. Marmosets range over shorter distances than tamarins and feed primarily on tree exudates, a clumped resource that requires patience to wait for sap to exude [6–9]. These results show that
discounting functions are context specific, shaped by a history of ecological pressures.

Results and Discussion
Tradeoffs between smaller, immediate gains and larger,
delayed rewards are ubiquitous for both humans and nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) [10, 11]. Many animal species highly discount the future, devaluing rewards by 50% in
the first few seconds of delay [1–3, 5, 12, 13].
Animal discounting stands in stark contrast to human discounting, where subjects wait for weeks, months, and years
[10, 14]. In these experiments, however, subjects often chose
between hypothetical monetary rewards over hypothetical
timeframes (e.g., “Would you prefer to receive $50 now or
$2000 in three years?”). Experiments that more closely mimic
the animal foraging tasks by offering real monetary rewards
and making subjects wait for real time delays show much more
impulsive choices in humans [15]. This implies that the experimental context in which discounting choices are framed can
directly influence decision making.
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Figure 1. Experimental Apparatus
(A) Both tamarins and marmosets traveled to receive their rewards in a plexiglas enclosure.
(B) The food rewards were lined up in an array on a ledge in the box, each piece ~1 cm apart.
(C) Food boxes were placed at one of seven distances (35–245 cm) from the front of the enclosure. A wall was placed behind the far box.

distance to the large reward significantly affected the subject’s
probability of choosing the large reward (repeated-measures
ANOVA: F5,32 = 5.35, p < 0.01). Subjects reduced their preferences for the large reward when placed farther away from
them. However, a species difference appears to drive this distance effect. The two species tended to differ in their overall preference for the large reward, although this difference
did not reach statistical significance (F1,6 = 4.42, p = 0.08).
There was, however, a significant interaction between species
and distance (F5,33 = 3.43, p = 0.01). Marmosets selected the
larger reward less at the farthest distances (increments six and
seven) relative to the closest distance (increment one), but
tamarins were equally likely to choose the larger reward at all

distances (Bonferroni posthoc tests, p < 0.05). Thus, marmosets selected the larger reward less frequently as a function of
increasing distance, whereas tamarins maintained their preferences for the large reward independently of distance (Figure
2). Further analyses and a follow-up experiment suggest that
neither satiation nor visual discrimination differences can account for this pattern (see the Supplemental Data available at
the end of this article).
The marmosets’ relative preference for near contrasts with
their ability to wait longer than tamarins for the large reward
in the temporal discounting task [5]. This reversal could occur because tamarins travel faster than marmosets, therefore requiring less time to receive the large reward. To inves-
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Figure 2. Effect of Species and Distance
on Choice.
Tamarins maintained their preference for the
large reward across all distances, whereas
marmosets reduced their preference for the
large reward as the distance to large increased. Error bars represent standard error
of the mean.

tigate this possibility, we measured the time required to travel
to the closest and farthest rewards in follow-up sessions (see
Supplemental Data). Overall, tamarins ran to the boxes in less
time than the marmosets (F1,6 = 10.38, p = 0.02), and this difference depended on distance (F1,6 = 15.93, p < 0.01): tamarins traveled to the farthest rewards faster than the marmosets (planned comparison, F1,6 = 15.15, p < 0.01; Figure 3).
Although marmosets did take longer than tamarins to reach
the farthest reward, their travel times were nonetheless much
shorter than the intervals that marmosets waited in the temporal discounting task. For temporal discounting, tamarins waited
an average of 7.9 s for six food pellets whereas marmosets
waited an average of 14.4 s [5]. To more quantitatively assess
whether temporal discounting can account for the species difference in preferences, we used the hyperbolic discounting
equation
V=

A
1 + kt

(where V = subjective value of a reward, A = reward amount,
k = discount factor, and t = time delay to receiving the reward
[33]) to estimate a discounting factor for each species with the
data from the temporal discounting experiment (see Supplemental Data). When we analyzed these discounting factors
along with the travel times in the spatial discounting experiment, we found that these temporal discounting factors predicted complete preference for the more distant reward. Thus,
we conclude that factors beyond those imposed by temporal
discounting influenced the spatial discounting of marmosets.
Though the marmoset results are inconsistent with temporal discounting alone, we cannot rule out an exclusive effect
of temporal discounting on tamarins’ preferences. Further
data are needed to clarify the role of time in tamarin spatial
preferences.

Figure 3. Effect of Species and Distance on Running Time
Tamarins and marmosets took the same amount of time to travel to
the short distance (increment one, 35 cm). Tamarins, however, traveled
to the farthest distance (increment seven, 245 cm) significantly faster
than marmosets. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

To determine whether reward magnitude influences tamarin and marmoset discounting, we compared sessions in
which subjects chose between one and three pellets to those
in which they chose between two and six pellets. Subjects
showed no significant difference in preference for the larger
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Figure 4. Effect of Species and Reward Magnitude on Choice
Neither tamarins nor marmosets altered their preferences for the
larger reward when choosing between one and three pellets or between two and six pellets. Therefore, they maintained their preferences for the same ratio of rewards but ignored absolute magnitude.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

reward across the two magnitude conditions (F1,6 = 1.55, p =
0.26). There was also no significant interaction between magnitude and distance (F5,29 = 1.50, p = 0.22) or between magnitude and species (Figure 4—F1,6 = 0.03, p = 0.88). Therefore,
changes in absolute magnitude did not influence discounting
in these monkeys when the ratio between rewards remained
constant.
Space and Time
Faced with the same sets of decisions between smaller,
closer rewards and larger, more distant rewards, tamarins
traveled farther for rewards than marmosets. Whereas marmosets reduced their preference for the large reward at the
farthest distances (210–245 cm), tamarins did not discount at
these distances. This demonstrates a reversal from the previous findings in which marmosets waited longer in a temporal
discounting task [5]. Because the tamarins did not discount
over these distances, we cannot determine whether spatial
context in particular and context more generally affect their
discounting. However, both the disparity between the marmosets’ preferences in these two tasks and a quantitative analysis of their temporal discounting levels imply that context influenced their decision making—spatial discounting was not
equivalent to temporal discounting. As a result, something in
addition to time must have played a role in their spatial discounting decisions.
Two other factors may account for the observed differences: energetic costs of traveling and predation risk. Models
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of temporal discounting behavior that take only reward quantity and time delays into account may make good approximations of animal choice, because the metabolic cost of waiting
for a food reward to appear may be negligible. However, when
animals must actively work to obtain food, the associated energetic costs are no longer trivial. For example, European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) adjusted their preference to account
for both the gain associated with rewards and the travel cost
of obtaining those rewards by means of walking as opposed
to flying [16]. Additionally, brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) demonstrated a rapid decrease in preferences for distant rewards, perhaps due to energetic costs of movement as
well as temporal aspects of intake rate [20, 21]. It is likely that
tamarins and marmosets also include the energetic costs of
traveling in their spatial discounting decisions.
Concerning predation risk, Waite [17] found that gray jays
(Perisoreus canadensis) were more reluctant to retrieve a
large food reward deep inside a tube when they previously
had to travel only halfway into the tube for the same reward
amount. Waite interpreted this result as a reflection of the increased predation risk associated with traveling farther into
the tube. Although the tamarins and marmosets in our study
were all born in captivity, they have observed free-flying raptors outside of their colony room and have experienced direct
exposure to approaches by a trained Northern goshawk (Accipiter gentiles) (A. Palleroni, C. Sproul, and M.D.H., unpublished data). Consequently, they might have perceived a potential predation risk when entering our apparatus.
Our results suggest that, at least in marmosets, discounting behavior is context specific: they will wait for food longer than tamarins but will not travel as far. A major selective
force that underlies foraging decisions is ecological context.
Previously, we ascribed the differences in tamarin and marmoset temporal discounting to ecological pressures and, in
particular, aspects of their feeding behavior [5] (see [34] for
a similar argument for memory differences in other tamarin
and marmoset species). A key difference between the two
species is the primary food items in their diet: tamarins specialize on insects, whereas marmosets specialize on gum
and sap exuding from trees [6–9]. This difference in foraging ecology aligns with the temporal discounting results: tamarins primarily consume an ephemeral food source that requires impulsive action, whereas marmosets prefer to feed
on a food source that requires scratching tree bark and then
patiently waiting for sap to exude. These foraging differences
may also account for ranging differences between species
[9]. Because tamarins feed on an ephemeral, dispersed food
source, they travel through large territories to find insects.
Marmosets, however, feed on a localized, immobile food
source and, consequently, face little pressure to travel long
distances for food [9]. As a result, the territory sizes of these
species are nonoverlapping, with tamarins averaging 7.8–10
ha and marmosets 0.5–5 ha [7, 8]; moreover, tamarins travel
farther on a daily basis (1700 m) than marmosets (700 m)
[35, 36]. As such, these two discounting tasks may actually
trigger different discounting strategies in the two species and
reflect the innate preferences each species has for one foraging mode over the other.
Although our data are consistent with the foraging ecology
hypothesis, we cannot completely exclude other hypotheses.
It is possible that foraging ecology has shaped the cost/benefit
functions of the species, such that these species differ in their
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travel costs or predation risk and, therefore, have different optimal strategies. Alternatively, other differences between these
species may account for our results, such as general activity
level, muscle mass, limb length, or basal metabolic rate. However, gummivory is a very powerful selective force that has led
to adaptive specializations in tooth morphology and digestive
physiology in marmosets [6, 37]. The far-reaching effects of
gummivory on other aspects of physiology and behavior are
difficult to disentangle from other selective forces.
Reward Magnitudes
Reward magnitude does not appear to influence tamarin or
marmoset preferences: both species discounted at the same
rate regardless of whether they chose between one and three
pieces of food or between two and six pieces of food. This
corroborates previous studies of animal discounting levels in
which there is no effect of magnitude on choice behavior [3,
27, 28]. As of yet, only humans reliably demonstrate a magnitude effect in discounting tasks, discounting smaller rewards
more highly than large rewards [14, 31, 32].
This divergence between the human and animal data may
result from different methodologies used to study discounting. Studies of human discounting use monetary rewards that
are often hypothetical. As such, these rewards can be much
larger than any feasible food reward. For example, in two studies that found a magnitude effect, one [14] titrated large money
amounts ranging from $100 to $100,000 and the other [31]
used reward amounts ranging up to $1,000,000. Thus, animals
may not demonstrate a magnitude effect simply because the
phenomenon in humans is an artifact of presenting extremely
large reward quantities—quantities that are both impossible to
offer animals in the laboratory, and unlikely to occur in the wild,
including our own species’ early history.
Experimental Procedures
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parent plexiglas ceiling (Figure 1A). In addition, the enclosure had a
movable back wall that we adjusted such that it was placed 70 cm behind the far reward for distance increments one to six and 35 cm behind the far reward for increment seven.
Trial and Session Procedures
The experimenter placed two black boxes (20 × 11 × 11 cm) that
contained the food rewards in the enclosure (Figure 1B). We lined
up the food rewards in an array on a ledge inside the box, each
piece ~1 cm apart. After placing food in the boxes at the appropriate distances, the experimenter waited 10 s for the subject to view
the choices and then removed the door. After removing the door, the
subject had one minute to leave the transport box and enter the apparatus and then had 30 s to make a decision. As soon as the subject made a choice (by touching a pellet) in a free session, the experimenter used a remote control to close the nonchosen reward box,
eliminating the possibility of obtaining these food pellets. We trained
subjects to return to the starting transport box after consuming their
chosen reward.
For each distance, increment subjects first completed a forcedchoice session of eight trials. In these sessions, subjects received only
one option per trial and thus gained experience with both distances
and reward contingencies. We presented four smaller, closer reward
trials and four larger, farther reward trials in randomized order. The following day, subjects completed a free-choice session of eight trials at
the same distance increment in which we allowed them to choose between the two options. In both session types, we randomly assigned
the side of the enclosure for larger and smaller rewards for each trial.
Please see the Supplemental Data for further details on experimental
methodology.
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Supplemental Data
Supplemental Results
The Role of Time in Spatial Discounting
Because tamarins traveled to the rewards more quickly than marmosets, the species’ differences in preferences could result from the
differential time delay to accessing the reward. To examine whether
temporal discounting could account for the observed difference, we
calculated a discounting factor for each individual in the temporal discounting experiment [S1] and tested whether using this discounting
factor predicts preferences in the spatial task. We used the hyperbolic
equation
V=

A
1 + kt

(where V = subjective value of a reward, A = reward amount, k = individual discount factor, and t = time delay to receiving the reward) as a
model of subjective value in this analysis [S2]. By measuring indifference points in the temporal experiment, we found the point at which
the subjects valued the small, immediate and large, delayed rewards
equally. Therefore, we can substitute our reward amounts and time delays into the hyperbolic equation such that
2
= 6
1 + kt1 1 + kt2
and solve for k for each individual. Because we used different individuals in the temporal and spatial experiments, we calculated the
mean discount factor for each species (kmarmoset = 0.149, ktamarin =
0.279) to use in the analysis of the spatial task. We then substituted
these species discount factors and the times required to access the
food rewards at different distances in the spatial task into the hyperbolic equation to calculate a subjective value for each option. Table S1
illustrates the subjective value placed on the closest and farthest options, assuming that the subjects use only temporal discounting to determine their choices. This analysis predicted that all subjects should
value the more distant reward more than the closer reward. Though
the tamarins do follow these predictions, the marmosets show reduced
preference for the distant reward, suggesting that temporal discounting alone cannot account for their preferences in the spatial task. However, because tamarins did not show indifference at the distances experienced in this apparatus, we cannot quantitatively assess the role
of temporal discounting.
Satiation
Another possible explanation for the species difference in spatial discounting is differing levels of satiation. Although this account is difficult to eliminate without an explicit test (e.g., manipulating levels of satiation), we examined the choice pattern within a session to look for
changes in choices over trials. If, for instance, marmosets stopped
traveling to the far distances because of increasing satiation during
a session, we would expect to see preferences for the larger reward
to decline over trials. On the contrary, there was no strong effect of
trial number (F7,33 = 2.13, p = 0.07), although there was a slight trend
to prefer the large reward more often in later trials. Importantly, the
lack of a species by trial interaction (F7,33 = 1.13, p = 0.37) implies
that marmosets did not choose the smaller reward more than tamarins
simply because they became satiated more quickly over the course of
a session.
Visual Discrimination
If tamarins and marmosets have different abilities to visually discriminate objects, this could account for our spatial discounting effect. That
is, if marmosets cannot distinguish the pellets at the far distances,
they may prefer the close reward that they can easily distinguish. Re-

search on the anatomy of tamarin and marmoset eyes suggests that
they have similar visual acuity. Specifically, common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) have peak cone densities and eye diameters very similar to golden-handed tamarins (Saguinus midas) [S3, S4], a species of
tamarin closely related to our cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus).
To examine species differences behaviorally, we conducted another follow-up study in which we provided subjects with a choice between two versus six pellets at the farthest distance. We began by
reacclimating subjects to sessions of the distance increment one comparison. Once subjects reliably chose the six pellets (nine or ten out
of ten times for two consecutive sessions), we presented them with
a session of both rewards at intermediate distances (135 cm). After passing one session at the intermediate distance, subjects advanced to the test sessions in which they had to choose between two
and six pellets both at the farthest distance increment (245 cm). Subjects faced three sessions at the farthest distance. To force subjects
to make a choice at the start box, we separated the two options with
an opaque plexiglas divider that ran lengthwise in the enclosure from
110 cm to the end of the apparatus. We considered passing the front
of the divider on one of the sides as a choice.
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on the arcsine,
square-root transformed proportion of choices for the large reward
by using replicate as a within-subject factor and species as a between-subject factor (four marmosets and three tamarins). Our analysis showed no effect of species (F1,5 = 2.98, p = 0.14) or replicate
(F2,10 = 2.78, p = 0.11), suggesting that both species could discriminate the rewards equally. Additionally, both marmoset and tamarins
preferred the large reward at levels above chance (marmosets: 72.5%
± 6.6%, t = 3.42, p = 0.04; tamarins: 85.6% ± 4.0%, t = 8.86, p = 0.01).
This task, combined with the anatomical similarities, suggests that
these two species should possess similar visual discrimination abilities. Thus, differences in discrimination cannot account for the species
differences in spatial discounting.

Supplemental Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Four cotton-top tamarins (three females and one male) and four common marmosets (two males and two females) of mixed experimental
history participated in this experiment. Three tamarins and three marmosets had prior experience in a temporal discounting experiment [1].
Relative to the marmosets, which have only been tested on the temporal discounting experiments and a few studies of auditory perception, the tamarins have been exposed to a wide diversity of experiments on tool use, cooperation, call perception, language processing,
and number representation [S5–S9].
Subjects received their daily food allotments after the experiments
were completed at the end of the day. Both tamarins and marmosets
were maintained at body weights that provided the most reliable performance in food-motivated tasks (about 90% free-feeding weight);
these weights approximate those observed in the wild. This experiment was approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee at Harvard University (Animal Subjects Codes 92-16 and 22-07).
Training
All subjects completed two phases of training prior to beginning this
experiment. In the first phase, subjects habituated to the enclosure
and reliably walked to the boxes to eat. In the second phase, subjects demonstrated a preference for the larger reward over the smaller
reward when the distance to both was equal (one distance unit).
Subjects had to complete two consecutive sessions choosing the
smaller reward no more than once.
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Table S1. Subjective Value for Both Options When Large Reward Is at
the Farthest Distance
Subject

Value for Two
Close Pellets

Value for Six
Distant Pellets

1.78
1.72
1.81
1.78
1.78

4.66
4.52
4.82
4.87
4.72

1.74
1.71
1.71
1.63
1.69

4.43
4.43
4.40
4.18
4.36

Marmosets
DES
JUL
LYS
OTH
Mean
Tamarins
DW
JK
KW
UB
Mean

Trial Setup
Before starting each individual trial, the experimenter placed the food
in the reward boxes (in random order for each trial) and moved the
boxes to the appropriate distances. Both food rewards were loaded at
the front of the apparatus (at one distance increment from the front of
the enclosure), and the larger reward was then moved the farther distance. This ensured that subjects had visual access to both food rewards at an equal distance. In addition, food rewards remained visible
to subjects throughout the trial even at the farthest distance. In forced
trials only one option was available; the second box remained closed
and placed at the appropriate distance.
Session Order
All subjects experienced seven distance increments for two magnitude comparisons for a total of 14 experimental sessions in which they
could freely choose between the two options (free-choice sessions of
eight trials each). In addition, subjects experienced a forced- choice
session on the day preceding each free-choice session (also with eight
trials each). So, for example, some subjects started off with a forcedchoice session of one pellet at distance-1 versus three pellets at distance-1, followed the next day by a free-choice session of the same.
The following day, they faced a forced-choice session of one pellet at
distance-1 versus three pellets at distance-2, then a free-choice session at the same distances the next day. This pattern continued until
they completed all seven distances. After a break of usually 5–14 days
(one subject experienced a break of 30 days and another experienced
a break of about 80 days), subjects started over at distance one with
the other reward magnitude. Half of the subjects started with one versus three pellets and half started with two versus six pellets.
Aborts and Session Passing Criteria
Subjects had to meet a number of criteria for a session’s data to be
considered acceptable. If subjects aborted on a given trial, then an
additional trial was added to the end of the session to bring the completed trial number to eight. If a subject aborted more than two times,
then we stopped the session, starting afresh on another day. Three
behaviors resulted in an aborted trial in all session types: (1) failing to
make a decision in the allotted time constraints (see procedure), (2)
failing to eat the chosen food reward (subjects could leave no more
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than one piece of food for all rewards quantities greater than one), or
(3) running past the farthest reward without choosing either option. All
experimenters were trained on these coding methods before running
a subject.
In addition, subjects had to meet passing criteria in forced sessions
in order to progress to the free-choice session. In forced trials, subjects were required to travel in a direct path to the one available food
reward; if subjects moved toward the closed, unavailable reward box
before attempting to eat the available option, then the trial was considered incorrect. In forced sessions, subjects had to correctly complete
at least seven out of eight trials for the session to count. If they failed
to do so, they repeated the forced session. In free-choice sessions, all
decisions were considered correct, assuming subjects did not abort.
However, in order to ensure that subjects’ choices were not driven by
a side bias toward one half of the apparatus, all free sessions in which
subjects chose the food reward on one particular side seven or more
times were discarded, and the condition was repeated.
Time Duration Coding
In order to assess whether subjects’ decisions in this discounting task
were driven by simple rate maximization, subjects completed four follow-up sessions after they had completed the main experiment. Specifically, subjects completed a forced session at the longest distance
(that is, one versus seven distance increments) for both magnitude
comparisons. We used these sessions to estimate how long it took
subjects to travel the longest and shortest distances they were tested
on over the course of the experiment. Two independent coders scored
the forced trials for two temporal measurements: (1) travel time—total time spent moving toward the box from when the subject left the
transport box to when they reached the chosen reward box and
stopped moving (time during which the subject paused while traveling was not included in this measurement)— and (2) handling time—
time spent eating the reward (from when the subject reached the reward box and no longer moved forward toward the box to when they
put the last piece of food in their mouth). The two coders were 96.1%
and 99.7% correlated on these measures, respectively.
One outlier trial was excluded from this analysis, because a marmoset took an exceptionally long time to run to the small reward; her
running time was more than seven standard deviations from the mean.
This trial was removed from all time analyses.
Statistical Analysis
We analyzed the data with a series of repeated-measures analyses
of variance. In the first analysis, we used reward magnitude (one versus three and two versus six) and distance-to-large (seven distances)
as within-subjects factors and species as a between-subjects factor. A
second analysis looked for changes over the course of a session, using trial number as a within-subjects factor (eight trials) and species
as a between-subjects factor. We arcsine, square-root transformed
the proportion choosing the larger reward in each free-choice session
(eight trials per session) for each subject to normalize the data. We
completed two more analyses for timing data on the follow-up experiment. One assessed the effect of distance (35 versus 245 cm) and
species on travel time; the second examined the effect of total pellet
number (one, two, three, or six) and species on travel time. In all analyses, we used the Huynh-Feldt correction when assumptions of homogeneity of variance were violated [S10]. We used Bonferroni procedures to test multiple comparisons of means in the within-subjects
design, and we report the pairwise comparisons with p ≤ 0.05 [S11].
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